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I. Introduction

“We are the people of Benicia. We have mobilized.”1 As local
activist Andrés Soto spoke these words, a petition unfurled behind
him containing the signatures of 4,081 concerned citizens—a
quarter of them Benicia residents—opposed to the construction of
a facility that would allow crude oil to be delivered into the town
by railcar.2 This meeting kicked off three consecutive nights of City
Council meetings concerning the crude-by-rail project.3 On each
night, the chambers were packed with concerned residents,
officials from other cities, and literally buses full of loosely
organized activists generally opposing the construction the crude
oil offloading facility.
Benicia—pronounced “Ben-Ē-sha” by visitors, but “Ben-ISHa” by locals—is an idyllic bedroom community located in the
crowded San Francisco Bay Area. The town was once, perhaps
surprisingly, one of California’s first capitals.4 Historically, its
location on the Carquinez Strait made it a perfect location to
develop ports and nurture California’s nascent industries.5 As the
“tanning capital of the west” and home to arsenals and shipyards,
Benicia contributed greatly to California’s economic and military
development.6 Even as the town’s wartime uses became less
1. Video of Benicia City Council Continued Regular Meeting (April 4, 2016),
https://benicia.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=1&clip_id=60&autostart
=0&embed=1 (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
2. Id.
3. See generally Agendas, Minutes, and Videos, CITY OF BENICIA,
http://www.ci.benicia.ca.us/agendas (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (containing the
minutes and video of the April 4, 5, and 6, 2017 Benicia City Council meetings)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Benicia’s History, VISIT BENICIA, http://www.visitbenicia.org/
content/benicias-history (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (“Just a few years after its
founding, Benicia was the third site selected to serve as the California state
capital . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See CITY OF BENICIA, HISTORIC CONTEXT STATEMENT 35 (2010),
http://ohp.parks.ca.gov/pages/1054/files/benicia%20context%20.pdf [hereinafter
HISTORIC CONTEXT STATEMENT] (describing shipping and the arsenal’s
contribution to the choice of Benicia as a state capital).
6. See id. at 67–72 (detailing Benicia’s economic contributions in earlystatehood-California).
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relevant, Benicia continued to evolve, and new industry sustained
the town.7 Importantly for this Note, in 1966, Benicia successfully
attracted its largest employer—now known as Valero Refining
Company.8
As is often the case, Benicia’s industrial development came
with an environmental price tag. Increasing awareness of
environmental issues, like air pollution and climate change,
resulted in increased scrutiny for the refinery.9 Local entities soon
formed in opposition to the refinery and stymied any new efforts
by the refinery to expand.10
In December 2012, to the dismay of a number of residents,
Valero submitted a land-use permit application to construct a
crude offloading facility—a necessity for offloading crude shipped
in railcars—and expand the refinery’s capacity to receive domestic
crude oil shipments.11 Currently, Valero receives almost all of its
crude oil via “marine vessel from Alaska and foreign sources,”
along with some from California producers.12 With an eye to
opening up the domestic market, the refinery hoped to construct a
7. See id. at 158 (listing new industries that took the place of the foreclosed
arsenal).
8. See id. (describing the refinery as the “most important” industrial park
tenant and stating that the revenues earned by the new refinery “helped stabilize
Benicia’s economy”).
9. See, e.g., Denis Cuff, Valero Refinery Faces $197,500 Fine for Fouling
Suisun Bay, E. BAY TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.eastbaytimes.
com/2016/10/17/benicia-valero-refinery-faces-197500-for-fouling-suisun-bay/
(last updated Oct. 18, 2016) (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (“State water pollution
regulators propose to fine the Valero oil refinery $197,500 for discharging more
than a million gallons of partially treated plant wastewater . . . .”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Valero Refinery in Benicia to Pay $122,500
in
Air
Pollution
Penalties,
E.
BAY
TIMES
(June
25,
2015)
http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2015/06/25/valero-refinery-in-benicia-to-pay122500- in-air-pollution-penalties/ (last updated Aug. 15, 2016) (last visited Jan.
9, 2017) (“The Valero oil refinery has agreed to pay $122,500 in civil penalties for
air pollution violations during 2011 . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
10. See, e.g., Home, BENICIANS FOR A SAFE & HEALTHY COMMUNITY,
http://www.safebenicia.org (last visited Oct. 14, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See Valero Refining Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 36036, slip
op. at 2 (STB served Sep. 20, 2016) (recapping the events leading up to the
Declaratory Order).
12. Id.
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crude-by-rail offloading facility capable of receiving two fifty-car
unit-trains per day.13
Valero’s proposal to construct the crude offloading facility
touched off a firestorm in Benicia,14 as well as in California
generally.15 Valero’s application was fraught with roadblocks,
ultimately requiring one land-use permit application submission,
two Environmental Impact Reports, two separate Planning
Commission denials, and four years.16 In the end, Valero changed
direction in the face of stiff opposition to its proposal.17 Instead of
going through the city, Valero attempted to chart a course around
the local government, completely ousting the city from the
decision-making process.18
On May 31, 2016, Valero petitioned the Surface
Transportation Board (STB), a federal agency, for a Declaratory
Order clarifying and limiting Benicia’s authority to deny Valero’s
permit application.19 Valero argued that the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) Termination Act preempted the City of Benicia
Planning Commission’s decision removing, or severely limiting,
the town’s ability to deny these permits as an undue interference
on railroads.20
13. Id.
14. See Rye Druzin, Valero Decides Not to Sue Benicia Over Crude-by-Rail
Denial,
SAN
ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS
(Dec.
23,
2016),
http://www.expressnews.com/business/eagle-ford-energy/article/Valero-decidesnot-to-sue-Benicia-over-10816140.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (“The fight over
the crude-by-rail project opened up rifts in [Benicia] where the Valero refinery is
a major employer . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See Tony Bizjak, Crude Oil Train Protests Planned in Sacramento, Davis,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(July
8,
2014),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/
local/article71926902.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (describing protests across
California regarding Valero’s crude by aril project) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
16. See Valero Refining Co., slip op. at 2–3 (recapping the events leading up
to the Declaratory Order).
17. Id.
18. Pet. for Declaratory Order, Valero Refining Co., FD 36036 (May 31,
2016).
19. Id.
20. See Valero Refining Co., slip op. at 1 (seeking a declaration that “denying
Valero’s conditional use permit for a crude oil off-loading facility [is] preempted
by 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)”).
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Preemption is a constitutional doctrine drawn from the dictate
that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . [are]
the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”21 So long as Congress acts under
an enumerated or implied power, it theoretically has the authority
to preempt any state or local regulation it sees fit.22 Historically, a
clear statement from Congress has been required before an act is
considered preemptive due to preemption’s potentially expansive
impact and interference with state sovereignty.23
California communities and industries both weighed in on this
fight. Refineries and railways asserted that the ICC Termination
Act preempts local permitting power when the proposed project
involves the shipment or receipt of crude oil via railcar.24 Whereas
localities—and the state of California25—asserted that denying use
permits is well within traditional police powers, particularly the
power to create regulations impacting public health, safety, and
welfare.26
STB jurisdiction encompasses those activities considered
“transportation” and those “performed by, or under the auspices of,
21. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
22. See Carter J. Strickland, Jr., Revitalizing the Presumption Against
Preemption to Prevent Regulatory Gaps: Railroad Deregulation and Waste
Transfer Stations, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1147, 1151 (2007) [hereinafter Strickland,
Revitalizing the Presumption] (describing the potential scope of preemption
doctrine).
23. See id. at 1154 (explaining that the presumption against preemption
“required a clear statement from Congress before the Supreme Court would
interpret a statute to displace states from regulating in areas in which they
historically operated”).
24. See Pet. for Declaratory Order at 3, Valero Refining Co., FD 36036 (May
31, 2016).
Valero maintains that the Planning Commission’s refusal to certify the
EIR and denial of the land use permit are federally preempted under
§ 10501(b) because they prevent rail transportation of crude oil to the
refinery, deny Valero its right to receive rail service, and prevent
[Union Pacific] from providing such rail service.
25. See Letter from Kamala Harris, Att’y Gen., State of California, to Amy
Million, Principal Planner, City of Benicia (Apr. 14, 2016) (opposing Valero’s
argument that Benicia was preempted from denying Valero’s conditional use
permit for construction of a crude oil offloading facility) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See Benicia, Cal., Res. 16-150 (Oct. 13, 2016) (asserting the City’s
authority over public health, safety, and welfare).
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a ‘rail carrier.’”27 Yet, the scope of “permissible indirect rail
regulation” remains unclear.28 In the Valero case, the STB issued
a surprising decision, holding that the city’s permitting authority
was not preempted “because the Planning Commissions decision
[did] not attempt to regulate transportation by ‘rail carrier’” and
the refinery did not present facts indicating they were operating
“under the auspices of a rail carrier.”29 This is the only STB
decision dealing with the precise question and the federal courts
have yet to take it up.
After Benicia’s successful rejection of crude-by-rail, multiple
localities have become emboldened and also denied refinery permit
applications for the construction of offloading facilities.30 The fruits
of local activism, both up-rail and down-rail, have hindered crudeby-rail expansion plans across the West, but refiners, crude oil
producers, and rail carriers have significant incentive to push
back.31 As discussed below, there are significant competitive
advantages and financial incentives for railroads and refineries,
especially on the West Coast, to import crude via railcar.32 Given
the high stakes for both localities and corporations, the preemption
issue is far from settled.
The question explored in this Note is whether, or perhaps to
what extent, the ICC Termination Act preempts localities from
using land-use permitting authority to deny a refinery’s permit
application for construction of a crude offloading facility. The scope
27. Valero Refining Co., slip op. at 4.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 4.
30. See, e.g., Tony Bizjak, Oil Company Dealt Another Blow on Plan to Ship
Crude
by
Train,
SACRAMENTO
BEE,
Oct.
6,
2016,
http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article106475912.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2016) (explaining that the San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors recently
denied Phillips 66 a permit to build a crude offloading facility at its refinery) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Donna Beth Weilenman, Council
Denies Valero Crude-By-Rail Project, BENICIA HERALD, Sep. 22, 2016,
http://beniciaheraldonline.com/council-denies-valero-crude-by-rail-project/ (last
visited Oct. 14, 2016) (identifying the Benicia City Council as the first local
authority to deny a refinery a permit to construct a crude offloading facility) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. See infra Part II.A (discussing the economics of crude-by-rail).
32. See infra Part II.A (same).
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of the ICC Termination Act’s Preemption Clause depends largely
upon the answer to two questions. First, whether Congress
intended the ICC Termination Act to cover local regulations, such
as land-use permits. And second, whether Congress intended
refineries to be among the covered parties under the Act. To
analyze these questions, this Note investigates how the ICC
Termination Act’s textual definitions, legislative intent, and
judicial application combine to create an unclear mandate that
could threaten local control over matters of genuine local import.
This Note proceeds in the following course: Part II explores
refiner and producer motives to expand crude-by-rail into the
Western market.33 The California market creates significant
incentives and opportunities for crude producers, refiners, and
railroad companies, but it also poses political risks and structural
challenges. Part III evaluates the ICC Termination Act’s language
and the relevant legislative history.34 This history demonstrates
that, in an attempt to deregulate the railroad industry, Congress
sought to draft a preemption clause that covered all “economic
regulation,” but with room for preservation of some traditional
local police powers. Part IV evaluates the broad, and sometimes
incongruous, application of the ICC Termination Act in federal
courts and the STB.35 Lastly, using the text, legislative history,
and jurisprudence as a guide, Part V argues that under no
circumstances should a refinery be considered a “rail carrier,” and
therefore, the ICC Termination Act should not preempt local
zoning laws impacting refineries.36 Ultimately, this Note counsels
against a broad reading of ICC Termination Act preemption. Any
preemptive result would dangerously threaten local autonomy and
open every community in the United States to crude-by-rail
delivery, no matter the concerns of the local government and the
people.

33. See infra Part II (providing an overview of the economic justification for
crude-by-rail on the West Coast).
34. See infra Part III (exploring the legislative history of the ICC
Termination Act).
35. See infra Part IV (evaluating the judicial application of the ICC
Termination Act).
36. See infra Part V (concluding that the ICC Termination Act Preemption
Clause should not apply to crude-by-rail offloading facilities).
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II. Crude-by-Rail: The Most Economically and Competitively
Feasible Method of Domestic Crude Shipment to the West
To understand why crude-by-rail is important to domestic oil
producers, oil refiners, and the railroad industry, it is important to
understand the economic and strategic incentives for expanding
and developing crude-by-rail facilities. As discussed below, oil
production is increasing in the United States, yet there are few
shipment methods available for domestic oil producers seeking to
market their product on the West Coast. While crude-by-rail is the
one economically feasible strategy to ship the crude, it is politically
difficult. Nonetheless, moneyed interests have significant
incentives to move crude from domestic producers to Western
refiners and pursue the fight in the courts.
A. Oil Production and Transportation in the United States
In the United States, domestic crude oil production is
increasing at a dramatic rate.37 Currently, domestic crude oil
production—at 9.4 million barrels per day—is rapidly approaching
its historic peak—9.6 million barrels per day.38 A significant
portion of the increased production is due to North Dakota’s
booming crude oil industry centered in the Bakken Shale
Formation.39 Additionally, crude oil production has increased in
areas such as the Eagle Ford Group in Texas, the Marcellus
Formation in Pennsylvania and Ohio, and the Niobrara Formation
in Wyoming.40

37. See ASS’N OF AM. R.RS., U.S. RAIL CRUDE OIL TRAFFIC 1 (2015)
https://www.aar.org/BackgroundPapers/US%20Rail%20Crude%20Oil%20Traffic
.pdf [hereinafter AAR, CRUDE OIL TRAFFIC] (indicating that U.S. crude production
increased from 5.0 million barrels per day in 2008 to 9.4 million barrels per day
in 2015).
38. See id. (displaying historical data regarding historic levels of U.S. crude
oil production).
39. See id. at 2 (demonstrating that production of crude oil in North Dakota
rose by 982% in 12 years to 1.2 million barrels per day).
40. See id. at 1 (listing the locations of large shale deposits in the contiguous
United States).
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Transportation of crude oil by railroad is a relatively recent
phenomenon. The practice’s popularity peaked in 2014 when it was
used to transport 382 million barrels of crude within the United
States.41 Today, crude-by-rail moves 319 million barrels of crude
per year42—most frequently between North Dakota producers and
refineries on the East Coast.43
Crude oil must be processed at refineries in order to be made
useful as gasoline, jet fuel, asphalt, or a litany of other
byproducts.44 Ideally, these refineries should be located near water
for two important reasons: (1) water is used in the refining
process,45 and (2) nearby ports make importing crude and
exporting refined oil easier.46 Midwestern geography and
infrastructure make the region inadequate to refine the massive
amounts of oil produced in North Dakota.47 Therefore, crude
producers in the Bakken must outsource refinement to any of three
destinations better suited for these requirements—the Gulf Coast,

41. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MOVEMENTS OF CRUDE OIL AND SELECTED
PRODUCTS
BY
RAIL
(2016),
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/
pet_move_railNA_a_EPC0_RAIL_mbbl_a.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2017)
(displaying data regarding the amount of crude transported via railroad between
each Petroleum Administration for Defense District) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See AAR, CRUDE OIL TRAFFIC, supra note 37, at 3 (“Crude oil has little
value unless it can be transported to refineries . . . .”).
45. See Eve Troeh, An Oil Refinery Secures an Essential Material: Water,
MARKETPLACE (Aug. 21, 2012), https://www.marketplace.org/2012/08/21/
sustainability/oil-refinery-secures-essential-material-water (last visited Jan. 7,
2017) (“To turn crude oil into car-ready gas, you need a lot of water.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. See Daniel Gross, The Great Oil Refinery Shortage, SLATE (June 8, 2004),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2004/06/the_great_refinery_sh
ortage.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (explaining the various reasons oil is often
produced near the coast) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
47. See
Rail
Transportation
Today,
A M.
PETROLEUM
INST.,
http://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/wells-to-consumer/transporting-oilnatural-gas/rail-transportation/rail-transportation-today (last visited Jan. 9,
2017) (“Because of [the Bakken’s] geographic location and lack of energy
infrastructure, operators have been transporting crude oil from production areas
to refineries by rail.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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the East Coast, or the West Coast.48 Crude producers, however,
have extraordinarily limited access to the West.
B. The Size of the California Crude Oil Market Provides
Significant Incentives and Opportunity for Investment
The Western states, while ideal for refineries, are not readily
accessible to domestic crude oil producers, especially compared to
the Southern and Eastern states. Although pipelines are by far the
nation’s most heavily utilized transportation method for crude
oil,49 very few pipelines lead to Western states.50 Therefore,
Western states like California are heavily reliant on foreign crude
oil shipments.51 In an effort to expand the domestic crude oil
market in the West, producers, railroads, and refiners are
attempting to exploit crude-by-rail.52 Although “[r]ail is a relatively
high-cost method of transportation,”53 a unique confluence of
circumstances make crude-by-rail a compelling option for
producers seeking to
reach the California, Oregon, and
Washington markets.
48. See AAR, CRUDE OIL TRAFFIC, supra note 37, at 3 (“[M]ost U.S. refineries
are located in traditional crude oil production areas (Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana)
or on the coasts . . . rather than near new production areas like North Dakota.”).
49. See John Frittelli et al., U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil:
Background Issues for Congress, in TRANSPORTING CRUDE OIL BY RAIL 1, 4 (Rosario
S. McLaughlin ed., 2014) [hereinafter Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil]
(“[P]ipelines and oceangoing tankers have delivered the vast majority of crude to
U.S. refineries, accounting for approximately 93% of total receipts . . . .”).
50. One need only view a map of crude pipelines on the West Coast to see the
infrastructure’s insufficiency. See Where Are Liquids Pipelines Located?,
PIPELINES 101, http://www.pipeline101.com/where-are-pipelines-located (last
visited Jan. 9, 2017) (displaying a map of crude oil pipelines in the United States)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. See W. STATES PETROLEUM ASS’N, OIL AND GAS IN CALIFORNIA: THE
INDUSTRY AND ITS ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION IN 2012
6
(2014),
https://www.wspa.org/sites/default/files/uploads/O%26G_Contribution_20140418
.pdf (estimating that California imports 50.7% of crude oil supply from foreign
sources).
52. See Rail Transportation Today, AM. PETROLEUM INST., supra note 47
(“Domestic deliveries from shale plays to West Coast refineries have also offset
declining production in California and Alaska.”).
53. Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 6.
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The most important factor driving crude producers to reach
the Western states is opportunity, specifically the opportunity to
capitalize on the California market. The most recent U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) estimates show California
consuming nearly 630 million barrels of petroleum per year.54 This
makes California one of the largest consumers of such products on
the planet.55 Yet, of the 163,600 train shipments of crude
originating in North Dakota in 2012, only 2,000 shipments (1%)
were sent to California.56 Again, this enables domestic California
oil producers and foreign producers to dominate the California
crude market.57
Beyond the size of the market, other factors help justify the
use of crude-by-rail in the West. First, Bakken crude oil sells for
$4 to $28 less per barrel than other crude oil.58 Although rail
transportation costs are approximately $5 to $10 higher than
pipeline transportation,59 the lower cost of Bakken crude allows
refiners to recoup the higher transportation costs.

54. Total Petroleum Consumption Estimates, 2014, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
https://www.eia.gov/state/seds/data.cfm?incfile=/state/seds/sep_fuel/html/fuel_us
e_pa.html&sid=US&sid=CA (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
55. See Pet. for Declaratory Order at 8, Valero Refining Co., FD 36036 (May
31, 2016) (identifying California as one of the largest consumers of gasoline “in
the world”); International Energy Statistics, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?pa=0000001&c=ruvvvvvfv
tvnvv1urvvvvfvvvvvvfvvvou20evvvvvvvvvnvvuvo&ct=0&tl_id=5-A&vs=INTL.52-AFG-TBPD.A&ord=SA&vo=0&v=H&start=2013&end=2014 (last visited Jan.
7, 2017) (comparing the annual petroleum consumption of different countries) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. US Gov’t Accountability Office, Oil and Gas Transportation: Department
of Transportation Is Taking Action to Address Rail Safety, but Additional Actions
Are Needed to Improve Pipeline Safety, in OIL AND GAS TRANSPORTATION: PIPELINE
AND RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE SERIES 1, 30 Figure 7 (Elton Simmons ed., 2015)
[hereinafter GAO, Oil and Gas Transportation].
57. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (providing an overview of
California’s oil importation).
58. See Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 6
(evaluating the economic incentives for using crude-by-rail).
59. See id. at 8 (“Railroad transport costs in the neighborhood of $10 to $15
per barrel compared to $5 per barrel for pipeline.”).
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Railroads also offer producers and refiners significant
flexibility.60 It is exceedingly difficult to construct new refining
facilities61 and exceedingly expensive to construct new pipelines.62
Railroads are administratively more efficient to build than
pipelines and cost less to construct.63 Additionally, the national
railroad infrastructure vastly exceeds pipeline infrastructure.64
While there are 57,000 miles of crude oil pipelines,65 there are
140,000 miles of railroad track, enough for U.S. tracks to circle the
earth nearly six times.66 Other factors making railroads
competitive, despite the increased cost, include higher quality
transportation,
shorter
contract
terms
than
pipeline
transportation (ten to fifteen years shorter), and shorter overall
transportation timelines (five to seven days compared to forty
days).67

60. See id. at 7 (“Railroads are a viable alternative to pipeline transportation
largely because they offer greater flexibility.”).
61. See id. at 4 (“The last entirely new petroleum refinery in the United
States opened in 1976.”).
62. See id. at 4–5 (discussing the cost of constructing pipelines compared to
the cost of building railroads).
63. See id. at 7 (“Railroads can increase capacity relatively cheaply and
quickly by upgrading tracks . . . [and] do not require approval to make
improvements of existing lines.”).
64. See Tim Meko, Six Maps that Show the Anatomy of America’s Vast
Infrastructure,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
1,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/maps-of-americaninfrastrucure/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (visualizing America’s pipeline and
railroad infrastructure) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 7.
66. See ASS’N OF AM. R.RS., TOTAL 2013 ANNUAL SPENDING (2013),
https://www.aar.org/Infographics/Economic/High%20Resolution%20Images/AAR
_Spending_Infographic.pdf (“Railroads own 140,000 miles of track, enough to
circle the earth 5.6 times.”).
67. See Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 8–9
(expanding of the advantages of rail transportation of crude, as opposed to
pipeline).
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C. The West Lacks Both the Political and Structural Capacity
Necessary to Accommodate Crude-by-Rail Shipments
For the above reasons, refineries consider rail carriage the
only economically and competitively feasible method to ship crude
oil from Midwestern producers to Western refiners.68 Even so, the
West Coast lacks the structural capacity (i.e., offloading facilities)
and the political will (i.e., many communities, like Benicia, do not
want them) to allow crude-by-rail to take hold as an effective
transportation modality.69
As discussed, local refiners lack offloading equipment, causing
a significant impediment to the expansion of crude-by-rail.70 This
offloading equipment is necessary to transfer crude oil from the
tank cars to the refinery for processing.71 Currently, refineries and
producers alone have borne the cost of construction of these
offloading facilities, not the railroads.72 Railroad companies’
hands-off approach strengthens the hand of local activists, as it is
more difficult for refineries than railroad companies to argue for

68. See Valero Refining Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 36036, slip
op. at 2 (describing the Bakken crude as “economically and competitively”
accessible to California only by rail).
69. Crude-by-rail offloading facilities were recently considered or are
currently pending at Valero Refinery, in Benicia, CA; Alon Bakersfield Refinery,
in Kern County, CA; Phillips 66 Refinery, San Luis Obispo, CA; Shell Oil Puget
Sound, in Skagit, WA; Tesoro Savage Vancouver Refinery, in Vancouver, WA; and
Buckeye Terminal, in West Sacramento, CA. Pet. For Declaratory Order at 3–7,
Valero Refining Co., FD 36036 (May 31, 2016).
70. See Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 9 (“One
hindrance to the expansion of crude-by-rail has been the lack of tank cars and
loading and unloading infrastructure.”).
71. Construction of these offloading sites often involves: (1) construction of
the offloading rack, (2) installation of a floating-roof-tank to store the crude, (3)
installation of additional track and rail spurs, and (4) construction of additional
pipeline to transport the crude from the offloading facility to the refinery. See
Land Use Permit Application Crude-by-rail Project, Valero Benicia Refinery at 1
(Dec. 2012) (supplying an overview of the permit request).
72. See Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 9
(“[I]nvestment is being made by the oil industry or by rail equipment leasing
companies, not railroads.”).

160

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 146 (2017)

preemption.73 Thus, as local refineries apply for permits to build
these facilities, localities are successfully denying their requests.74
Crude-by-rail also faces significant political opposition in
Western states. California in particular is reticent to support any
industry that may impact carbon emissions, like transportation
and crude oil production.75 Moreover, recent derailments resulting
in death and environmental destruction, though rare, weigh
heavily on localities’ minds when considering the land-use permits
for offloading facilities.76 Some activists have even gone so far as
to draft “blast zone” maps that predict the effects of a train
explosion on local communities considering the construction of
facilities required for crude-by-rail transportation.77 Whether
these localities have the authority to deny these permits is a more
complicated question, and is the main focus of this Note.
III. ICC Termination Act: A Legislative History
The question of whether the ICC Termination Act preempts
local authority over traditional land-use permitting in situations
like the one presented in this Note makes more sense when the Act
is placed in its historical context. To understand the Act’s intended
preemptive effect, the long history of railroad over-regulation must
be taken into account. Ultimately, the ICC Termination Act arises
out of this history as the capstone of a larger deregulatory effort
73. See supra Part V.B (arguing that refineries should be unable to receive
the preemptive protections of the ICC Termination Act).
74. See supra note 30 (discussing recent instances of permit denials).
75. See Assembly Bill 32 Overview, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (reviewing
the features of the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006); see also
GAO, Oil and Gas Transportation, supra note 56, at 17–18 (discussing risks to
local air quality).
76. See GAO, Oil and Gas Transportation, supra note 56, at 18–19 (providing
details about crude-by-rail derailments occurring between 2013 and 2014 in Lac
Mégantic, Quebec; Gianford, Alberta; Aliceville, Alabama; Casselton, North
Dakota; Plaster Rock, New Brunswick; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).
77. See, e.g., NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CRUDE OIL TRAIN DERAILMENT RISK
ZONES IN BENICIA, CA (2014) https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/ca-crude-oilby-rail-Benicia.pdf. (diagraming the neighborhoods and schools endangered by a
crude-by-rail explosion in Benicia).
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that includes a number of other laws. The Act’s Preemption
Clause, viewed in the light of “total economic deregulation,” takes
on more force than might otherwise be presumed by the text alone.
The ICC Termination Act is a comprehensive regulatory
statute, made especially relevant because the STB operates by
terms prescribed therein.78 To understand the ICC Termination
Act’s full significance, it is important to understand the context in
which the Act arose.
A. Pendular Railroad Regulations: From Highly Permissive, to
Highly Restrictive, and Back Again
Prior to 1870, Congress intended most laws regarding
railroads to encourage their establishment and success.79 But, as
the railroads gained a foothold—eventually becoming massively
successful commercial enterprises80—they began to leverage their
market share and wield coercive market power over their
consumers and the towns in which they operated.81 Railroads’
market dominance profoundly affected many freight customers.82
Anticompetitive behavior caused significant antagonism between
“eastern financial interests” and the rural communities in which
the railroads operated, and contributed to railroad companies’
increasingly negative image.83 Freight customers and local
78. See infra Part III.B (reviewing the relevant provisions of the ICC
Termination Act).
79. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 71 (2002)
(examining the railroad regulatory landscape in the nineteenth century).
80. See James W. Ely, Jr., “The Railroad System Has Burst Through State
Limits”: Railroads and Interstate Commerce, 1830–1920, 55 ARK. L. REV. 933, 933
[hereinafter Ely, Railroads and Interstate Commerce] (describing the railroads as
“America’s first big business”).
81. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 90 (1995), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 164, 802 (“Because railroads possess certain characteristics of
natural monopolies, in the absence of competition from other modes of
transportation, railroads were able to wield enormous power over the shippers
and communities they served.”).
82. See id. at 91 (“[S]ome shippers and communities continue to be
dependent upon a single rail carrier and may not have access to alternative modes
of transportation . . . .”).
83. Id. at 90.
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communities raised a litany of complaints against the railroads,
but the railroads’ high and regularly fluctuating shipping rates
were of particular concern.84 Ultimately, these complaints were too
vociferous and persistent for local governments to ignore.85
In response to these concerns, states passed a patchwork of
laws attempting to reel in the rail industry’s abuses.86 Starting in
the 1870s, various Midwestern states passed “Granger Laws,” the
first of many laws regulating the railroad industry.87 Generally,
this patchwork of state regulations required railroads to charge
uniform rates for carriage—addressing freight shippers’ largest
complaint.88
As the public began to recognize the danger railroads posed to
surrounding communities,89 localities began to enact more and
more punitive regulations. For example, while farmers had no
recourse at common law when trains killed animals wandering
onto the tracks,90 states passed Railroad Fence laws to impose
liability on railroads for these losses.91 States also passed laws
regulating railroad crossing and safety92 and laws enumerating
railroad passenger rights.93 Increasing state regulation, however,
began to have a negative financial impact on the railroads.94
84. ELY, supra note 79, at 82–83.
85. See id. at 71 (“Although questions of safety and service were important,
unhappiness with rates was the principal force behind the push for more vigorous
railroad regulation.”).
86. See id. at 86–87 (listing the various states that passed Granger Laws and
their impacts).
87. See id. (same).
88. See id. at 81 (“The chronic complaint against the carriers, therefore, was
not exorbitant charges but unequal treatment of shippers and communities.”).
89. See id. at 117 (“Locomotives killed livestock, started fires, and collided
with vehicles at highway intersections.”).
90. See id. at 118 (“In short, under common law, owners allowed livestock to
wander at their peril and had no recourse if the animals were killed on the
tracks.”).
91. See id. at 117–19 (recounting litigation regarding Railroad Fence laws).
92. See id. at 126 (describing laws requiring railroads to ring bells and give
warning at crossings or be subject to liability for harm to individuals).
93. See id. at 132–33 (describing efforts to encourage railroads to stick to
schedules and deal with passengers fairly).
94. See Ely, Railroads and Interstate Commerce, supra note 80, at 942 (2003)
(“[S]tate regulations ‘had contributed significantly to the railroads’ financial
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The railroads’ unpopularity also made them an easy target for
congressional action. The federal government, recognizing the
administrative difficulty of myriad state regulations on railroads,
began to preempt local laws and establish uniform railroad
regulation.95 In 1887, Congress passed the Inter-State Commerce
Act (ICA).96 The ICA’s most important provision established the
ICC, which had “full control over interstate railroad charges”97 and
power to approve or disapprove railroad mergers and
acquisitions.98 Additionally, Congress passed the Railway Labor
Act which, in an effort to “promote the peaceful resolution of rail
labor conflicts,”99 guaranteed the “right of [railroad] workers to
organize without employer interference.”100 Congress also enacted
the Transportation Act of 1940, making the rail industry the first
industry required to guarantee income to displaced workers.101
The simultaneous operation of federal regulations and
those state regulations not fully preempted by federal law caused
significant uncertainty and inefficiency.102 By the 1970s, these
regulations’ cumulative effects resulted in a weakened and
uncompetitive railroad industry.103 Ultimately, seven major
railroads and multiple other companies descended into

troubles.’” (quoting HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–
1937 137 (1991))).
95. See id. at 962 (“Congress in the first two decades of the twentieth century
enacted a comprehensive scheme of federal railroad regulation, one consequence
was increased displacement of state regulatory authority over the rail industry.”).
96. See ELY, supra note 79, at 91 (providing information regarding the
passage of the ICA).
97. Ely, Railroads and Interstate Commerce, supra note 80, at 967.
98. See ELY, supra note 79, at 91–92 (describing the establishment and
authority of the ICC).
99. Id. at 258.
100. Id. at 259.
101. See id. at 263 (stating that the Transportation Act “directed the ICC to
include compensatory wage payments for four years in any merger approvals”).
102. See Ely, Railroads and Interstate Commerce, supra note 80, at 967 (“This
regulatory confusion clearly burdened the railroads as instruments of interstate
commerce.”).
103. See Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1159–60
(detailing the precipitating events which led to the passage of the ICC
Termination Act).
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bankruptcy.104 This crisis even brought a rare moment of
bipartisan agreement between the major political parties,
President Jimmy Carter, and then-candidate Ronald Reagan.105
All agreed that the railroad industry was in dire need of
deregulation.106
In one of its first forays into deregulation, Congress enacted
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 (Staggers Act).107 The Staggers Act
deregulated most railroad rates, legalized previously illegal
railroad shipping contracts, and simplified abandonment
proceedings.108 According to the ICC Termination Act’s drafters,
the Staggers Act “stimulated an explosion of service and marketing
alternatives that would not have been possible under the
Kafkaesque regulatory regime of the pre-Staggers era.”109 But the
Staggers Act was only the first step in a larger effort to deregulate
the railroad industry.
Concerns over bloated government and the growing regulatory
state put pressure on Congress and multiple Presidents to
deregulate the transportation industry.110 In his January 1995
State of the Union address, President William J. Clinton called on
Congress to continue its deregulatory efforts specifically, by
terminating the ICC.111 The waste represented by the ICC was so
104. Id.
105. See S. REP. NO. 104-176, at 3 (1995) (“In 1977, citing the ineffectiveness
of the ICC, President Carter created a task force that was charged with
streamlining the ICC and reducing regulation.”).
106. Id.
107. See Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1160
(providing that Congress enacted “deregulatory reforms designed to lower rates
and to loosen market exit and entrance restrictions”).
108. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 91 (1995), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 803 (enumerating the goals and provisions of the Staggers Rail
Act).
109. Id.
110. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., MOVING AMERICA NEW DIRECTIONS, NEW
OPPORTUNITIES: A STATEMENT OF NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY STRATEGIES
FOR ACTION (1990) 6 (“Economic regulation of trucking and other transportation
industries should be eliminated where regulation is unnecessary and
outmoded.”).
111. See Statement on Signing the ICC Termination Act of 1995 H.R. 2539,
32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Dec. 29, 1995) [hereinafter Signing Statement]
(stating that the President had called on Congress to eliminate the ICC and
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absurd to the administration that it was one of two departments—
alongside the Helium Reserve Program—to be comically paired as
examples of “programs we do not need.”112 The line received
bipartisan applause, and even a few shouts.113 Congress quickly
heeded the President’s call by passing the ICC Termination Act.114
B. The ICC Termination Act of 1995
Congress viewed the ICC Termination Act as a natural
extension of the Staggers Act and “the final chapter on
deregulation.”115 The drafters in the House held the Staggers Act
in high regard, considering it an important piece of legislation that
was essential to save the dying railroad industry.116 The House
Report even described the Staggers Act as producing a
“renaissance in the railroad industry,”117 one which the House
hoped to propel forward with the ICC Termination Act.
True to its name, one of the ICC Termination Act’s main
purposes was to dismantle the ICC.118 In the initial draft of the Act,
further reduce “unnecessary regulations” in the State of the Union address).
112. See State of the Union Address (January 24, 1995), MILLER CTR., U. VA.,
http://millercenter.org/president/clinton/speeches/speech-3440
(last
visited
Nov. 28, 2016) (“We propose to cut $130 billion in spending by shrinking
departments . . . [and] getting rid of over 100 programs we do not need, like the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Helium Reserve Program.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
113. See clintonlibrary42, The 1995 State of the Union (Address to a Joint
Session
of
the
Congress),
YOUTUBE
(Apr.
11,
2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hSBtgugeUk (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
114. See generally Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of
1995, 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101–16106 (2012).
115. See Disposition of the Railroad Authority of the Interstate Commerce
Commission Before the Subcomm. on R.Rs. of the H. Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure, 104th Cong. 6 (1995) [hereinafter Disposition of Railroad
Authority of the I.C.C.] (statement of Frank E. Kruesi, Assistant Secretary for
Transportation Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation).
116. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 90, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
802 (listing a number of measures Congress took to “salvage” the railroad
industry).
117. Id. at 90–91, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 802–03.
118. See
Overview
of
the
STB,
SURFACE
TRANSP.
BOARD,
https://www.stb.gov/stb/about/overview.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2016)
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the House of Representatives did not replace the ICC with any
particular body, but rather retained the Transportation
Adjudication Panel
to resolve disputes.119 However, during
conference, Congress decided to create a replacement body for the
ICC: the Surface Transportation Board, then housed in the
Department of Transportation (DOT).120 Ironically, in 2015, the STB
was elevated to an independent federal agency, much like the
ICC.121
Beyond simply paring down a top-heavy federal agency, the ICC
Termination Act continued the overhaul of federal regulation of
transportation systems generally.122 One of the ICC Termination
Act’s main functions was retooling the economic regulation of
railroads in the United States;123 however, the Act also addressed
the regulation of transportation by motor carriers124 and
pipelines.125
The Act’s railroad-specific provisions address a number of
regulatory issues. For example, the Act frees railroads to set their
(“Created on January 1, 1996 by the ICC Termination Act of 1995, the Board is
the successor to the former Interstate Commerce Commission . . . .”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
119. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-422, at 230 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 164, 915 (“Section 701 delineates the organizational powers of
the Transportation Adjudication Panel, including legal representation and budget
matters.”).
120. See id. at 231, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 916 (“The Conference
adopts a compromise provision. A three-member Surface Transportation Board is
established within the Department of Transportation.”).
121. See
Overview
of
the
STB,
SURFACE
TRANSP.
BD.,
https://www.stb.gov/stb/about/overview.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2017) (“The
STB Reauthorization Act of 2015 established the STB as a wholly independent
federal agency on December 18, 2015.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
122. See Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1160
(“[The] ICCTA substantially overhauled the Interstate Commerce Act and the
economic regulation of rail transportation . . . .”).
123. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101(1)–(15) (2012) (listing the enacted rail
transportation policy relating to railroad industry regulation).
124. See id. § 13501 (“The Secretary and the Board have jurisdiction, as
specified in this part, over transportation by motor carrier and the procurement
of that transportation . . . .”)
125. See id. § 15301 (“The Board has jurisdiction over transportation by
pipeline . . . .”)
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own rates,126 exempts the railroad industry from traditional
antitrust enforcement and review,127 and contains provisions
removing barriers to competitive operation of railroads.128
C. The ICC Termination Act Preemption Clause
Most importantly for the purposes of this Note, the Act also
grants “exclusive” jurisdiction to the STB over regulation of
transportation by rail carriers and preempts conflicting
regulations.129
Specifically, the ICC Termination Act contains a statement of
general jurisdiction, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (the
Preemption Clause). This jurisdictional statement provides that
the Surface Transportation Board’s jurisdiction over:
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies
provided in this part with respect to rates, classification,
rules (including car service, interchange, and other
operation rules), practices, routes, services and facilities
of such carriers; and
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment,
or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching or
side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or
intended to be located, entirely in one State,
is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the
remedies provided under this part with respect to
regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and
preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State
law.130
To understand the Preemption Clause’s reach, it is important
to define the terms “transportation” and “rail carrier,” as well as to
126. See id. § 10701 (providing standards, rules, and practices for rate
setting).
127. See id. § 10706 (exempting the railroad industry from traditional
application of antitrust laws).
128. See, e.g., id. § 11121 (creating standards for efficient use of and service
by rail cars).
129. See id. § 10501(b) (describing the STB’s jurisdiction of railroads).
130. Id. (emphasis added).
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assess their scope when used together. Per the Act,
“transportation” includes: (a) “locomotive, car, . . . property,
facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the
movement of passengers or property;” and (b) “services related to
that movement,” including receipt, delivery, and handling of the
property being transported.131 The crude offloading rack likely
constitutes “equipment . . . related to the movement
of . . . property,” as its sole purpose is to offload rail freight.
Therefore, it should be considered “transportation” under the Act.
The definition of “rail carrier” is slightly more fraught. While
potentially expansive, it has never been applied to its maximum
breadth.132 Per the Act, “rail carrier” is defined as “a person
providing common carrier railroad transportation for
compensation.”133 A “person” can be an “assignee or personal
representative” of a rail carrier,134 whereas the definition of
“railroad” includes “intermodal equipment used by or in connection
with” rail transportation or a facility “used or necessary for
transportation.”135 This definition is potentially quite broad. While
a refinery seems not to be a “rail carrier” at first blush, it very well
could be “a [personal representative] providing common carrier
[intermodal equipment used in rail transportation] for
compensation.”
D. The Preemption Clause’s Application to Refineries’ Crude
Offloading Rack Building Permits
“[S]tates cannot regulate matters that the [STB] can, and,
conversely, . . . states are free to regulate matters that the [STB]
cannot.”136 Therefore, as an initial matter, crude-by-rail offloading
facilities at refineries must properly fall within the definition of
“transportation” and “rail carrier” in order to fall under STB
131. Id. §§ 10102(9)(A)–(B).
132. See infra Part IV.C (providing an overview of the use of the term “rail
carrier” in case law).
133. Id. § 10102(5) (emphasis added).
134. Id. § 10102(4).
135. Id. §§ 10102(6)(A), (C).
136. Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1165.
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jurisdiction and benefit from preemption.137 A cold, textual reading
of these definitions demonstrates their breadth and weighs in favor
of preemption.
The first inquiry is whether crude offloading facilities meet the
Act’s definition of “transportation.” Refinery crude offloading sites
facilitate the removal of crude oil from tank cars.138 Once offloaded
from the cars, the oil is transferred to a pipeline that moves the oil
a relatively short distance to the refinery.139 These offloading
facilities consist of steel racks, approximately twenty-three feet in
height, connected by a cross-track walkway.140 Generally, these
racks are placed on parallel rail spurs and capable of offloading
two tank cars simultaneously.141 As discussed, this process seems
to fall well within the Act’s definition of transportation as it is a
“service[] related to” the receipt of freight by railcar.142 Without the
crude offloading facility, a refinery cannot transfer freight from the
tank car to the refinery.
Second, the Preemption Clause is only applicable if the
transportation—in this case offloading—is “by rail carrier.”143 If a
refinery does not qualify as a “rail carrier,” or service or facility of
such a carrier, under the Preemption Clause, then the ICC
Termination Act alone can not preempt a city’s denial of a
refinery’s land-use permit as the STB would have no
jurisdiction.144 Read broadly, a crude offloading facility run by a
“personal representative” of a railroad might fall under the
Preemption Clause. As discussed later in this Note, this broad

137.
138.

See supra Part III.C (providing the requirements for ICCTA application).
See generally VALERO REFINING CO., VALERO CRUDE BY RAIL PROJECT
DESCRIPTION (2013), http://www.ci.benicia.ca.us/vertical/Sites/%7B3436CBED6A58-4FEF-BFDF-5F9331215932%7D/uploads/Valero_CBR_Project_
Description.pdf (describing the construction process and uses for a crude
offloading facility).
139. See id. at 12 (“Two pumps, operating in parallel, would pump the crude
oil from the unloading rack header via a new 16-inch pipeline to [a tank].”).
140. See id. at 7 (describing the crude offloading rack).
141. Id.
142. See infra Part III.D (applying the ICC Termination Act definition of
“transportation” the crude offloading rack).
143. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(1).
144. See id. § 10501(b) (describing the STB’s jurisdiction).
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reading has little basis in the legislative history and is not
supported by the case law.145
Ultimately, the text alone is not enough to determine whether,
or under what circumstances, a refinery petitioning to build a
crude offloading facility could be considered “transportation by rail
carrier.” It is also essential to review the history surrounding the
ICC Termination Act’s adoption and subsequent court
interpretation of the Preemption Clause. To fully understand scope
of these terms, one must understand the types of regulation the
Act was indented to preempt. Additionally, it is important to
explore how this coverage determination might change depending
on the circumstances under which a refinery is applying for the
land-use permit—i.e., whether it acts independently, acts as the
railroad’s agent, or acts in concert with the railroad in some other
capacity.
E. ICC Termination Act Preemption Clause: Drafting and
Legislative History
1. How Far Does the ICC Termination Act’s Preemption Clause
Reach?
It appears that Congress intended the Preemption Clause to
have far-reaching implications.146 In fact, the House Report
specifies that the clause represents the “direct and complete preemption of State economic regulation of railroads.”147 Confusingly,
the Report also purports to eliminate the “former disclaimer
regarding residual State police powers” as Congress considered it
“unnecessary, in view of the Federal policy of occupying the entire
field of economic regulation of the interstate rail transportation
system.”148 It is unclear whether Congress considered this clause
145. See infra Part III.E (providing an overview of the ICC Termination Acts
legislative history and judicial application); Part IV (same).
146. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 95, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
807 (providing the rationale and purpose of the Preemption Clause).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 95–96, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 807–08.
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“unnecessary” because the statute clearly preempted state police
powers or because it clearly did not. However, scholars have
generally presumed the latter, inferring that the Act meant to
leave some room for state regulation.149
The House Report recognizes that, at a minimum, “[s]tates
retain the police powers reserved by the Constitution.”150 However,
the Report follows by immediately asserting “the Federal scheme
of economic regulation and deregulation is intended to address and
encompass all such regulation and to be completely exclusive.”151
To reinforce the Preemption Clause’s importance, the Report
warns that any interference by the States would endanger and
subvert the “Federal scheme of minimal regulation . . . .”152 For
these reasons, courts and scholars have had difficulty identifying
precisely where “completely exclusive” federal preemption should
begin and state police powers end.
Congress focused specifically on the preemption issue when it
conducted hearings regarding the “sunset” of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.153 In fact, Congress devoted a significant
portion of testimony to whether federal railroad regulations should
preempt state and local regulations.154 The majority of those
testifying believed that local regulation should be preempted.155
Again, Congress, having witnessed the economic disintegration
caused by patchwork local regulations in the 1800s, did not wish
to repeat history in this respect.156
149. See Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 104, at 1165
(“Congress considered the preemption clause to be so clear that a savings clause
protecting state police powers was ‘unnecessary.’”).
150. H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 96, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 808.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See generally Disposition of the Railroad Authority of the I.C.C., supra
note 115 (containing testimony regarding the then-potential elimination of the
I.C.C.).
154. See id. (discussing the importance, scope, and application of federal
preemption of state and local economic regulations).
155. See id. at 43–44 (statements of Robert D. Krebs, President, Chairman, &
CEO, Santa Fe Pacific Corporation; James A. Hagen, Chairman & CEO,
Consolidated Rail Corporation; and Drew Lewis, Chairman & CEO, Union Pacific
Corporation) (agreeing that preemption of local and state regulation of railroads
is necessary for an efficient rail network).
156. See id. at 42 (statements of Drew Lewis, Chairman & CEO, Union Pacific
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After the hearings and Conference Committee, Congress
expanded further on the meaning and intent behind the general
jurisdiction provision. Exclusive jurisdiction, Congress explained,
is “limited to remedies with respect to rail regulation—not State
and Federal law generally.”157 So, for example, criminal laws
remain un-preempted.158 Congress also specified that laws should
remain
valid
“unless
specifically
displaced,
because
they . . . generally collide with the scheme of economic
regulation.”159 Therefore, it seems the Act is intended to preempt
this type of “economic regulation.”
The congressional framework of “complete preemption” of
economic regulation along with some carve-out for traditional
police powers gives only a vague notion about the kind of
regulations Congress hoped to preempt. The question is whether
land-use permitting schemes, intended to protect local residents’
health and safety, are examples of such regulations. If Congress
did not intend to preempt these regulations, then it does not
matter whether refineries constitute “transportation by rail
carrier,” as the Act is inapplicable.
2. What Qualifies as an “Economic Regulation”?
By 1995, the nation’s railroad system was already on a
trajectory toward complete deregulation.160 As described in the
Corporation) (noting his belief that “we have to have preemption, . . . without
preemption, we could and would be subject to a myriad of [sic] State laws” opening
railroad companies up to lawsuits and other financial obstacles); id. at 109
(statements of Hon. Gail McDonald, Chairman, ICC) (“Absent such preemption,
there would be great potential for interference in rail consolidation efforts.”).
157. H.R. REP. NO. 104-422, at 167 (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 852.
158. See Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1165
(“Congress surely did not intend to allow railroads to open gambling or
prostitution businesses that are exempt from generally applicable state laws, and
subject only to [STB] supervision.”).
159. H.R. REP. NO. 104-422, at 167 (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 852.
160. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 90 (“Since 1980, with the enactment of the
Staggers Rail Act, the railroad industry has operated in an essentially
deregulated environment.”).
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preceding section, the railroads were simply unable to compete
with other burgeoning methods of transportation.161 One of the
important purposes behind the ICC Termination Act was to make
the railroad industry more competitive with trucks, pipelines, and
barges.162 In fact, by eliminating economic regulations, Congress
hoped the ICC Termination Act would “further foster” intermodal
transportation—the transportation of freight via multiple modes,
including vessel, rail, and pipeline—by “remov[ing] all existing
restrictions
that
specifically
limit
or
preclude
163
intermodal . . . operations.”
A policy supporting the use of intermodal transportation
suggests that Congress contemplated the notion of nonrail
facilities—like crude offloading facilities—being used to transport
freight—like crude oil—and ultimately favored it. Historically, the
use of transloading facilities—those facilities used to “[transfer]
goods from one mode of transportation to another in order to have
the goods reach their final destination”164—has been a major
subject of litigation.165 Offloading facilities, on the other hand,
have not. While courts generally treat transloading facilities as
falling within the Preemption Clause’s coverage,166 it is unclear
whether an offloading facility would be treated in the same
manner. Crude offloading facilities, however, do share some
resemblance
to
traditional
conceptions
of
intermodal
transportation.167
161. See supra Part III.A (presenting a brief history of railroad deregulation).
162. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 90 (explaining that deregulation efforts are
made more necessary because of “the emergence of the trucking industry, as well
as the pipeline and barge industries” and the increased competition therefrom).
163. S. REP NO. 104-176, at 13 (1995).
164. Transloading, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/
transloading.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
165. See infra notes 263–273 and accompanying text (describing cases
involving transloading facilities).
166. See infra Part IV.C (reviewing case law surrounding transloading
facilities).
167. Compare
Maschine
zum
Übersetzen
der
Diligencen
auf
Eisenbahnwaggons, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (1884), https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Datei:Maschine_zum_Übersetzen_der_Diligencen_auf_Eisenbahnwaggons.JPG
(last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (portraying a stagecoach being transferred onto a
railcar via a contraption not dissimilar to a crude offloading rack) (on file with the
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Congress also specifically discussed the importance of
complete federal control over remedies.168 Congress intended the
Preemption Clause to insulate the railroads from liability, as
“[e]xclusive preemption of other remedies would prevent a
confusing situation where legal actions are instituted under a
variety of laws.”169 According to some scholars, the ICC
Termination Act’s preemptive effect should be felt most strongly in
cases “related to the movement of goods, such as delivery, transfer,
and loading.”170 These statements support the idea that offloading
facilities are precisely the types of facilities Congress hoped to
protect from local intrusion.
Further examination of changes in the bill and congressional
testimony helps clarify the meaning of “economic regulation.”
Specifically, the Committee, and those testifying before it, focused
heavily on preempting state and local interference with mergers,
labor restrictions, and other economic regulations.171 Many of those
testifying called on Congress to enact preemptive regulations
similar to the legislation passed during the previous year that
prevented localities from regulating motor carriers.172 The motor
carrier regulations significantly curtailed local interference by
Washington and Lee Law Review), with Maria Gallucci, US Oil Book 2014: US
Railroads Are Moving Greater Volumes of Crude Oil This Year Amid Bakken
Drilling Boom, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/us-oilboom-2014-us-railroads-are-moving-greater-volumes-crude-oil-year-amidbakken-1672564 (last visited June 1, 2017) (portraying a crude-by-rail trail
stationed at an offloading rack) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
168. See S. Rep. No. 104-176, at 57 (1995) (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft)
(“[R]ecent court decisions have allowed actions against carriers to proceed under
other laws, . . . [and] exclusive remedies are needed to provide consistent methods
of resolving disputes and prevent needless litigation.”).
169. Id.
170. Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1162 n.63.
171. See Disposition of the Railroad Authority of the I.C.C., supra note 115, at
109 (statement of Hon. Gail McDonald, Chairman, Interstate Commerce
Commission) (stating that without preemption “[s]tates and localities could
attempt to impose locally-oriented conditions on rail consolidations that could
effectively block a transaction or dilute its more general public benefits”).
172. See id. at 223 (statement of Joseph Canny, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Transportation Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation) (“We believe that
state authority should be preempted by statute, as was recently done with motor
carrier regulation . . . .”).
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preempting any regulation impacting the price of bus
transportation by interstate carriers.173
Regarding mergers, those testifying before Congress
extensively discussed whether to remove antitrust enforcement
authority from the DOT and give it to the Department of Justice
(DOJ).174 Two important considerations animated congressional
thinking regarding this transfer of power: (1) whether the
openness of the pre-merger review proceedings would be
compromised; and (2) whether regulatory attempts by states and
localities would continue to be sufficiently preempted if antitrust
enforcement authority was transferred to the DOJ.175 Erring on
the side of preemption, Congress decided to house antitrust review
authority with the STB, rather than the DOJ, and to generally
exempt railroads from most traditional antitrust laws.176 Even for
antitrust enforcement, Congress desired STB dominance.
Congress also used the ICC Termination Act to insulate Class
II and Class III railroads from more onerous regulation.177 Over
the objections of a strong pro-labor contingent,178 Congress relaxed
173. See FAA Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-311, § 211 (1994)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10936 (2012))
A State or political subdivision of a State may not enforce any law or
regulation relating to interstate fares for the transportation of
passengers by bus by an interstate motor carrier of passengers over
routes authorized by the Commission.
174. See Disposition of the Railroad Authority of the I.C.C., supra note 115, at
5–61 (containing the testimony of multiple parties regarding antitrust
enforcement and the railroads).
175. See id. at 31–33 (statement of Hon. Gail McDonald, Chairman, Interstate
Commerce Commission) (discussing the advantages of keeping antitrust and
merger review authority housed in the DOT).
176. See 49 U.S.C. § 10706(a)(2)(A) (“[T]he Sherman Act . . . , the Clayton
Act . . . , the Federal Trade Commission Act . . . , sections 73 and 74 of the Wilson
Tariff Act . . . , and the Act of June 19, 1936 . . . do not apply to parties and other
persons with respect to making or carrying out the agreement.”).
177. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10902 (2012) (promoting the “clearer and more
expeditious handling” of transactions by Class II and Class III rail carriers in
order); H.R. REP. NO. 104-422, at 180 (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 865 (“Class II rail carriers acquiring a line under this section are
subject to a mandatory [one]-year severance pay requirement . . . . No protection
is imposed on Class III rail carrier line acquisitions.”).
178. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-422, at 524 (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 849 (“I strongly object to the manner in which this bill treats
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labor protections for Class II and III railroads as part of an effort
to make rail carriage more competitive with pipeline and motor
transportation.179 In its report, the House reinforced the idea that
the “Committee consider[ed] [the less stringent protections] crucial
to avoid imposing the large and potentially fatal costs of unfunded
labor protection benefit mandates on on Class II and Class III
transactions.”180
It appears Congress favored regulation of Class II and III
railroads even less than Class I railroads.181 Importantly, Class II
and III railroads are the most frequently utilized railroad systems
for freight shipping.182 They provide freight carriers access to a
large network of towns and ports inaccessible to Class I
railroads.183 Therefore, local permitting requirements for the
construction of crude offloading facilities are more likely to impact
Class II and III railroads, as opposed to Class I railroads.184
Lastly, knowing what is not included within the umbrella term
“economic regulation” can be just as helpful as knowing what is
included. For example, the House Report specifically allows for two
exemptions from the expansive deregulation effort. First, the
Report provides that state and federal securities laws are not
necessarily preempted.185 Second, the House Report states that the
Committee “does not intend for this section to alter any existing
law . . . governing railroad retirement benefits and railroad
railroad labor.”).
179. See 49 U.S.C. § 10902(d) (providing that labor protections for Class II
and Class III railroads are lower than those of Class I railroads).
180. H.R. REP. NO. 104-311 at 102, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 814.
181. See Frittelli, U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 20
(stating that “[m]embers of Congress have been concerned with preserving short
line rail service” and providing multiple measures Congress enacted to aid in their
preservation).
182. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-422, at 524–25 (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 864–65 (explaining that the statutory divisions between Class I
and Class II and III railroad were intended to “promote clearer and more
expeditious handling” of freight).
183. See Frittelli, U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 46, at 20
(describing the use of “shortline” tracks for crude-by-rail delivery).
184. Id.
185. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 96, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
808 (stating that the abolition of the ICC “places the railroad industry for
securities purposes in the same position as other industries”).
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unemployment insurance.”186 In providing these specific
exemptions, Congress sets some boundary lines, as presumably,
laws regulating securities and retirement pensions would
otherwise be included within the umbrella of “economic
regulation.”
Overall, the ICC Termination Act’s legislative history
emphasizes economic preemption. The contours of this economic
preemption are shaped by congressional testimony and the
statements of congressmen and senators. Congress not only
favored intermodal transportation options, but it also hoped that
lowering barriers to competition would increase the railroads’
competitiveness with trucks and pipelines.187 However, it is still
important to observe how the federal courts have applied the Act
in order to fully understand the Act’s scope.
3. Who is a “Rail Carrier”? What Constitutes “Services and
Facilities” of Such Carriers?
There is almost no mention of the definition of the term “rail
carrier” or the rationale behind its drafting in the legislative
history. The lone mention of the definition of “rail carrier” appears
in the Senate Report.188 The Report requests that the Conference
Committee “update and clarify the term ‘rail carrier’” and “remove
references to passenger transportation.”189 The final Act specified
that the definition “does not include street, suburban, or
interurban electric railways not operated as part of the general
system of rail transportation,” but does not exempt passenger lines
entirely.190 Whether the definition is “clarified,” however, is an
open question.

186. Id.
187. See S. Rep. No. 104-176, at 6 (1995) (describing negatively patchwork
regulations that would “weaken the [railroad] industry’s efficiency and
competitive viability”).
188. See id. at 29 (1995) (discussing Senate concerns with the definition of
“rail carrier” provided in the House Report).
189. Id.
190. 49 U.S.C. § 10102(5).
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In the absence of legislative history, it is useful to look at
precedent acts that define the terms of art used in the ICC
Termination Act. The ICC Termination Act departs from prior acts
in two important ways. First, the Act redefines the term “railroad”
from its original meaning in the Inter-State Commerce Act of 1887
(ICA). Under the ICA, “railroad” is defined as “all bridges and
ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad” and any
“road in use by any corporation operating a railroad . . . .”191 No
other act redefined this term. Rather than replace the definition,
both the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (4R
Act), passed in 1976, and the Staggers Act, passed in 1980, simply
refer back to the definition used in the ICA.192
It makes some sense that Congress would seek to replace the
ICA’s definition of “railroad,” as the ICA was the act that created
the ICC, the agency Congress now sought to to disband.193
Moreover, it appears that the ICC Termination Act’s definition of
“railroad” is in fact much broader than the ICA’s.194 This may be a
function of technological innovations that occurred between 1887
and 1995, or perhaps Congress’s general goal of fewer regulations.
The second distinction is that the ICC Termination Act creates
two separate definitions for “rail carrier” and “railroad.”195 This
fact is not addressed in the legislative history either. However, it
seems safe to assume that “rail carrier” is a broader term than
“railroad,” as the latter term is used in the definition of the
former.196 It is difficult to divine why exactly Congress redefined
191. Inter-State Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, sec. 1, 24 Stat. 379, 379
(1887).
192. See Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-210, § 102(7), 90 Stat. 31, 34 (1976) (referring to the Interstate Commerce
Act for the definition of “railroad”); see, e.g., Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-448, §§ 201(a), 203(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1895, 1898, 1900 (providing that the Act
references back to ICC jurisdiction in defining “railroad”).
193. See Inter-State Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, sec. 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383
(1887) (“[A] Commission is hereby created and established to be known as the
Inter-State Commerce Commission . . . .”).
194. See supra notes 190–191 and accompanying text (listing the ICA’s
definition of “rail carrier” and the ICC Termination Acts definition of “rail
carrier”).
195. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 10102(5), (6) (defining “rail carrier” and “railroad”
respectively).
196. See id. § 10102(5) (“‘[R]ail carrier’ means a person providing common
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“railroad” and added “rail carrier,” but the result is likely a broader
term than was originally meant.
IV. ICC Termination Act Preemption: Judicial Application and
Analysis
Neither the STB nor the courts seem to have adopted
Congress’s more limited view of ICC Termination Act preemption.
Whereas both the congressional record and the text of the Act itself
focus on total economic freedom for the railways,197 Congress and
the President hoped the Act would be interpreted more broadly and
enforced more vigorously than the legislative history might
suggest.198
One axiomatic line that appears in much ICC Termination Act
litigation captures the courts’ broad jurisprudential approach well:
“[The Inter-State Commerce Act is] among the most pervasive and
comprehensive of federal regulatory schemes.”199 In fact, many
courts find it “difficult to imagine a broader statement of
Congress’s intent to preempt state regulatory authority over
railroad operations” than the one in Section 10501(b).200 This is
evident from the overview of ICC Termination Act’s preemption
jurisprudence that follows.

carrier railroad transportation for compensation . . . .”).
197. See supra Part III.E.2 (exploring the meaning of economic regulation in
terms of the ICC Termination Act).
198. See Signing Statement, supra note 111, at 933-1 (“[The President]
call[ed] upon the board to use this authority to the fullest extent to benefit
consumers and facilitate economic growth.”).
199. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318
(1981).
200. City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 1998)
(quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 944 F. Supp. 1573, 1581
(N.D. Ga. 1996)).
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A. The General ICC Termination Act Preemption Rule
1. Categorical Preemption

The federal courts and the STB have interpreted Section
10501(b) as preempting two broad groups of direct regulation:
preclearance and matters directly regulated by the STB. First, the
Act preempts any form of local permitting or preclearance over
railroad activity.201 The ICC Termination Act affirmatively
preempts any direct regulation over railroad practices and
operations, regardless of whether it is discriminatory or
unreasonable.202 For example, federal courts have consistently
struck down laws regulating railroad crossings, train speed, and
other operating requirements.203
The scope of the categorical preclearance preemption changes
slightly depending upon the case and the Circuit.204 Even so, most
courts “recognize[] that requiring a rail carrier to obtain a locally
issued permit before conducting rail operations . . . will impose an
unreasonable burden on rail transportation.”205 The STB went
even further when it provided that “any form of state or local
permitting or preclearance that, by its nature, could be used to
201. See Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“We need not draw a line that divides local regulations between those that are
preempted and those that are not, because in [the] case [of pre-construction
permit requirements] preemption is clear.”); DesertXpress Enterprises, LLC—
Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 34914, slip op. at 3 n.4 (STB served June 27,
2007) (providing that preclearance is one of two broad categories of preempted
state and local action).
202. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 227 Or. App.
468, 473–74 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (distinguishing between laws of general
applicability and those that specifically target railroad operations).
203. See Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 439, 453 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“Regulating the time a train can occupy a rail crossing impacts, in such areas as
train speed, length and scheduling, the way a railroad operates its trains . . . .”);
Burlington Northern, 227 Or. App. at 474 (concluding that “[d]ictating where and
for how long a train may stop . . . [is] a regulation of railroad operations” and is
therefore preempted).
204. See Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1166–67
(providing that the 2nd, 9th, and D.C. Circuits have adopted a broader view of
preemption than the 3rd, 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits).
205. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. City of Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150, 160 (4th Cir. 2010).
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deny the railroad the ability to conduct its operation or to proceed
with activities that the Board has authorized” is preempted by
Section 10501(b).206 This ruling suggests that local regulation of
third parties that “could be used” to impede railroad operations
may be preempted. However, no subsequent STB ruling has
suggested that Section 10501(b) should be applied with this level
of breadth.207 Overall, most cases deal with preclearance for
railroad projects, not third party projects that may impact the
railroads.208
The second type of regulation categorically preempted
includes “state or local regulation of matters directly regulated by
the Board.”209 In other words, the ICC Termination Act preempts
state laws when they “may reasonably be said to have the effect of
managing or governing rail transportation, while permitting the
continued application of laws having a more remote or incidental
effect on rail transportation.”210 The Act replaces state and local
remedies with those provided under the STB’s exclusive
jurisdiction,211 thereby excluding local regulations providing
alternative requirements.212

206. DesertXpress, FD 34914, slip op. at 3 n.4.
207. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35701, slip
op. at 4 (STB served Nov. 4, 2013) (explaining that nuisance claims are preempted
because they “directly result from . . . rail operations”).
208. See generally supra Part IV (reviewing case law applying the ICC
Termination Act Preemption Clause).
209. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., FD 35701, slip op. at 3.
210. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 227 Or. App. 468,
472–73 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson,
500 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 2007)).
211. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(1) (providing that the “remedies provided in this
part” are exclusive).
212. See Cities of Auburn & Kent, WA, 2 S.T.B. 330, 1997 WL 362017, at *6
(1997) (“[W]here the local permitting process could be used to frustrate or defeat
an activity that is regulated at the Federal level, the state or local process is
preempted.”).
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2. As-Applied Preemption

Some local actions, rather than being categorically preempted,
are simply preempted as applied.213 Federal railroad law does not
preempt state law where rail activities are “merely a peripheral
concern” of the regulations at issue.214 Local regulations are only
preempted when applied in a manner that: (1) “unreasonably
burden[s] or interfere[s]” with rail transportation,215 or
(2) discriminates against rail carriage.216
The determination of whether a regulation unreasonably
interferes with rail operations “is a fact-specific one” in which the
court exercises its “policy-based judgment.”217 The “most obvious”
element used to determine if a regulation is unreasonably
burdensome is whether the regulation is “so draconian that it
prevents the railroad from carrying out its business in a sensible
fashion.”218 For example, when a locality’s apparent goal is to
constrain, rather than render safe, rail operations, the locality is
likely regulating in an unreasonably burdensome manner.219
Furthermore, generally applicable permitting and land-use
requirements are not significant oversteps of local authority,
213. See Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 593 F.3d 404, 414 (5th Cir. 2010)
(“[I]t is well settled that states cannot take an action that would have the effect
of foreclosing or unduly restricting a railroad’s ability to conduct any part of
operations . . . .”).
214. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959).
215. See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 622 F.3d 1095,
1097–98 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Generally speaking, ICCTA does not preempt state or
local laws if they are laws of general applicability that do not unreasonably
interfere with interstate commerce.”); New England Transrail, LLC—Petition for
Declaratory Order, FD 34797 (STD served July 10, 2007) (“Other state or local
requirements are not preempted unless, as applied, they would have the effect of
preventing or unreasonably interfering with interstate commerce.”).
216. See N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 254 (3d
Cir. 2007) (“[A] state law that affects rail carriage survives preemption if it does
not discriminate against rail carriage . . . .”).
217. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35701, slip op. at
3 (STB served Nov. 4, 2013).
218. New York Susquehanna, 500 F.3d at 254.
219. See Cities of Auburn & Kent, WA, 2 S.T.B. 330, 1997 WL 362017, at *6
(finding that the city’s “admitted goal is to constrain [the rail carrier’s] train
operations,” and therefore, the locality is preempted).
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unless they discriminate against rail carriage.220 Some cases
suggest that only regulations not involving “the exercise of
discretion on subjective questions” are permissible,221 while other
courts have insisted that this interpretation is far too generous.222
In Green Mountain Railroad Corp. v. Vermont,223 the court
provides additional factors to help determine whether a town’s
exercise of traditional police powers is acceptable.224 These include:
(a) “the extent that the regulations protect public health and
safety,” (b) whether they “are settled and defined,” (c) whether they
“can be obeyed with reasonable certainty,” and (d) whether they
“entail no extended or open-ended delays.”225
Local land-use ordinances are often broadly applicable and
applied with some degree of objectivity. Therefore, it might be hard
to find a circumstance where a locality denying a crude offloading
facility permit based on one of these ordinances is acting
“discriminatorily” toward rail carriers. However, some courts have
recognized a pretext-based argument that would allow a refinery
to argue that these objective regulations were being
discriminatorily applied.226

220. See New York Susquehanna, 500 F.3d at 253 (“[E]ven pedestrian
regulations like building codes must be applied in a manner that does not
discriminate against railroad operations to avoid preemption.”); Green Mountain
R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Electrical, plumbing and fire
codes, direct environmental regulations enacted for the protection of the public
health and safety, and other generally applicable, non-discriminatory regulations
and permit requirements would seem to withstand preemption.”); CXS Transp.,
Inc., 2005 WL 584026, at *8 (S.T.B. 2005) (declaratory order) (invalidating a law
attempting to prevent terrorism on the ground that it was unreasonably
burdensome and discriminatory toward rail transportation).
221. Green Mountain, 404 F.3d at 643.
222. See, e.g., New York Susquehanna, 500 F.3d at 254 (stating that generally
applicable regulations must be “settled,” “definite,” “avoid open-ended delays,”
“clear,” and not able to be used as a “pretext” for interfering with rail service).
223. 404 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2005).
224. See id. at 643.
225. Id.
226. See infra Part IV.A.3 (providing an overview of pretextual regulation).
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3. Pretextual Regulations

Even regulations that appear facially nondiscriminatory per
the Green Mountain factors might still be invalidated for a more
tacit form of discrimination: pretext. While courts have not
frequently utilized a pretextual analysis, the court in New York
Susquehanna & Western Railway Corp. v. Jackson,227 required
that the regulations be “clear enough that the rail carrier can
follow them and that the state cannot easily use them as a pretext
for interfering with or curtailing rail service.”228
STB filings show that localities typically preemptively defend
against the argument that an otherwise objectively broad
ordinance is simply pretext for discrimination against railroads.229
Generally, local arguments in favor of land-use permit denials
contain three elements: (1) the effects of the planned construction,
not of the railroad, caused the permit denial; (2) the facility is still
able to receive rail service; and (3) local ordinances are not a
pretext for regulating the railroad.230
Some cases have suggested that a rail carrier, too, can be
subject to pretextual limitations. The ICC Termination Act defines
the term “rail carrier” as a “person providing common carrier
railroad transportation,”231 where a “person” can be a “trustee,
receiver assignee, or personal representative.”232 This indicates
that agents and those “acting under the auspices of a rail carrier”
are sometimes covered by the Act.233 However, the STB has stated
that this fact does not “suggest that a party can contractually
determine its status as a railroad carrier for regulatory

227. 500 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2007).
228. New York Susquehanna, 500 F.3d at 254 (emphasis removed).
229. See SEA-3—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35853, slip op. at 3
(S.T.B. served Mar. 17, 2015) (recounting the city of Portsmouth’s argument
defending their permit denial); Reply to Pet. for Declaratory Order at 12–13, City
of Benicia, FD 36036 (July 7, 2016) (providing an overview of the city’s reasons
for denying Valero’s land-use permit application).
230. Id.
231. 49 U.S.C. § 10102(5).
232. Id. § 10102(4).
233. SEA-3, FD 35853, slip op. at 6.
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purposes.”234 In other words, “railroads and loaders may not
change by contract what in practice is a substantially different
relationship.”235
B. The Scope of “Economic Regulation” in the Case Law
The case law is not quite as categorical in its distinctions
between economic and non-economic regulation as the ICC
Termination Act’s drafters might have envisioned. In fact, some
courts flagrantly flout the legislative history, with one court
stating “there is nothing in the case law that supports [the city’s]
argument that, through the ICC [Termination Act], Congress only
intended preemption of economic regulation of the railroads.”236
Yet, this statement is contradicted by the House Report, which
argues for the “direct and complete pre-emption of State economic
regulation of railroads.”237
Neither the STB nor the courts have developed any
comprehensive rule to determine whether a regulation is economic
or non-economic, perhaps because they do not see the distinction
as determinative. Rather, these determinations are made on a
“case-by-case” basis.238 For example, the courts and the STB have
found the following types of regulations to be preempted: nuisance
claims,239 zoning regulations that prevent the use of freight
yards,240 regulations limiting the use of “integral” transloading
234. Hi Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295, 308 n.19 (3d Cir. 2004).
235. N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 250 (3d Cir.
2007).
236. City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 1998).
237. H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 95, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 807.
238. City of Alexandria, VA—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35157, slip
op. at 2 (S.T.B. served Feb. 17, 2009).
239. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35701, slip
op. at 1 (S.T.B. served Nov. 4, 2013) (finding claims for damages caused by “noise
and vibration as well as the discharge of smoke, dust, dirt and other particulates”
preempted).
240. See Bo. & Me. Corp. & Springfield Terminal R.R. Co.—Petition for
Declaratory Order, FD 35749, slip op. at 4 (S.T.B. served July 13, 2013) (stating
that “[t]he Town’s order prohibiting all rail traffic to the warehouse conflict with
the federal right of [Petitioner] to request common carrier service” and are
therefore preempted by Section 10501(b)).
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facilities,241 and rules governing the amount of time a train can
stop at rail crossings.242 It is difficult to glean any patterns from
this particular set of rulings.
Environmental regulations have been a particular problem for
the courts. The court in City of Auburn v. United States243
specifically noted that economic and environmental regulation
could be one in the same.244 The court further posited that “if local
authorities have the ability to impose ‘environmental’ permitting
regulations on the railroad, such power will in fact amount to
‘economic regulation’ if the carrier is prevented from constructing,
acquiring, operating, abandoning or discontinuing a line.”245 In
contrast, the Green Mountain court called any artificial
distinctions between economic and environmental regulations “not
useful.”246 Ultimately, courts have focused on the level of “burden”
to draw the line between permissible and impermissible regulation
rather than focusing on their economic or non-economic qualities,
as the legislative history might suggest.247
The court in Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corp. v.
South Dakota,248 drew a slightly different line, focusing instead on
the considerations the state needed to make in order to approve or
not approve a permit.249 In this case, Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern
241. See Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 2005)
(determining that the ICC Termination Acts preempted the pre-construction
permit requirement for an integral transloading facility).
242. See Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 267 F. 3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2001)
(providing that “[r]egulating the time a train can occupy a rail crossing
impacts . . . the way a railroad operates its trains, with concomitant economic
ramifications” and is therefore preempted by Section 10501(b)).
243. 145 F.3d 102 (9th Cir. 1998).
244. See id. at 1031 (“[G]iven the broad language of § 10501(b)(2) . . . the
distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘environmental’ regulation begins to blur.”).
245. Id.
246. Green Mountain, 404 F.3d at 644.
247. See N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 252 (3d
Cir. 2007) (“What matters is the degree to which the challenged regulation
burdens rail transportation, not whether it is styled as ‘economic’ or
‘environmental.’”).
248. 236 F. Supp. 2d 989 (D.S.D. 2002), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 362 F.3d
512 (8th Cir. 2004).
249. See id. at 1007 (explaining that the statute was invalid because it
“necessitates that the Governor consider economic, environmental, and public
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Railroad challenged a South Dakota law that granted railroads
eminent domain powers, but placed restrictions on those powers.250
The restrictions included: (1) requiring the railroad to demonstrate
that it had sufficient financial resources to undertake construction
and potential mitigation, and (2) requiring the Governor to
consider the “economic, environmental, and public safety
implications of the [rail] project” before approving a railroad’s use
of eminent domain.251 Ultimately, the court struck down Section
49-16A-75.3 reasoning that the state cannot “regulate
indirectly . . . what it cannot regulate directly.”252 By doing so, the
statute violated Section 10501(b) of the ICC Termination Act.253
Dakota demonstrates that courts are willing to look into the
decision-making process of a local official (i.e., the Governor) to
determine whether the official’s considerations are economic in
nature. Yet, courts do not seem curtailed by the “economic”
confines outlined in the legislative history. In contrast to this broad
vison of economic regulation, the courts have trimmed back on the
potential scope of the term “rail carrier.”
C. The Preemption Clause’s Application to Third Parties: Who Is a
“Rail Carrier”?
As discussed, the ICC Termination Act only applies to “rail
carriers” and the services and facilities of such carriers.254 While
there may be significant wiggle room within this definition, courts
have not typically interpreted it too broadly. Instead, courts and
the STB have insisted that “facilities not integrally related to the
provision of interstate rail service are not subject to our
safety implications of the . . . project. Yet, state regulation of such areas in the
context of railroads is preempted by federal law.”).
250. See id. (requiring a showing of sufficient financial resource among other
things).
251. S.D.C.L. § 49–16A–75.3(2).
252. Dakota, Minn., & E. R.R., 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
253. See id. (noting that “state regulation of such areas in the context of
railroads is preempted by federal law”).
254. See supra Part III.C (detailing the ICC Termination Act Preemption
Clause).
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jurisdiction or subject to federal preemption.”255 Whether a facility
is “integrally related” depends on the particulars of the case.256
Multiple different methods have been utilized in making this
determination.
One interesting distinction between the STB and the federal
courts is that, while the federal courts typically use the “rail
carrier” definition alone,257 the STB uses the ICC Termination
Act’s definition of “railroad” rather than “rail carrier” when
characterizing Section 10501(b)’s reach.258 As discussed
previously, Section 10501(b) states that the Act’s preemptive scope
covers “transportation by rail carrier,” but the term “railroad” is
used in the definition of “rail carrier,” potentially broadening the
meaning of rail carrier considerably.259 While this distinction does
not seem to impact case outcomes, it lends some support to a
broader reading of the term.260
In general, courts have relied on a series of factors to help
determine whether an entity is a “rail carrier.” In Padgett v.
Surface Transportation Board,261 the court used the following
considerations to classify a liquid petroleum gas transloading
facility as a “rail carrier”: “(1) whether the rail carrier holds out
transloading facilities as part of its business, (2) the degree of
control retained by the [rail] carrier, (3) property right and
maintenance
obligation,
(4)
contractual
liability,
and
(5) financing.”262 These factors have been replicated and rephrased
255. Borough of Riverdale, 4 S.T.B. 380, 1999 WL 715272, at 387.
256. See SEA-3—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35853, slip op. at 5
(S.T.B. served Mar. 17, 2015) (“Whether a particular activity is considered part of
transportation by rail carrier under § 10501 is a case-by-case, fact-specific
determination.”).
257. See Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 640 (2d Cir. 2005)
(citing to Section 10102(5)); N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500
F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 2007) (same).
258. See Valero Refining Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 36036, slip
op. at 4 (S.T.B. served Sept. 20, 2016) (citing to Section 10102(6)); SEA-3, FD
35853, slip op. at 5 (same).
259. See 49 U.S.C. § 10102(5) (emphasis added) (“‘[R]ail carrier’ means a
person providing common carrier railroad transportation . . . .”).
260. See supra Part III.D (discussing the potentially expansive definition of
“rail carrier”).
261. 804 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2015).
262. Id. at 108 (quoting Tex. Cent. Bus. Lines Corp. v. MAALT L.P., 669 F.3d
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in various ways, but have largely remained the same throughout
the case law.263
To explore the practical breadth of the term “rail carrier,” it is
important to investigate which non-traditional rail facilities have
been thought to fall within its scope. In a seminal case, the state of
New Jersey challenged New York Susquehanna and Western
Railway Corporation’s (Susquehanna) construction of solid waste
transloading facilities.264 The railroad either owned or leased the
land on which these facilities were built.265 Rather than operating
the transloading facility itself, Susquehanna hired a third party to
“unload the trucks bringing in the waste, oversee its storage, and
load it onto rail cars.”266 The state argued that Susquehanna’s
waste sorting operations were not “‘integrally’ or ‘closely’ related to
providing rail service” and therefore should not be considered
“transportation” under the ICC Termination Act.267 Yet, the court
held that transloading facilities fall within the scope of
“transportation” as defined by the ICC Termination Act.268
In determining that New Jersey’s complaint was preempted,
the Susquehanna court identified several attributes that
supported the claim that the storage and transloading facility was
a “rail carrier”: (1) Susquehanna built, owned, and advertised the
facility as its own; and (2) Susquehanna’s agent operated the

525, 530–31 (5th Cir. 2012)).
263. See, e.g., City of Alexandria, VA—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD
35157, slip op. at 2–3 (S.T.B. served Feb. 17, 2009)
[Listing factors such as:] [1] whether the rail carrier holds out
transloading as part of its service; [2] whether the railroad is
contractually liable for damage to the shipment during loading or
unloading; [3] whether the rail carrier owns the transloading facility;
[4] whether the third party is compensated by the carrier or the
shipper; [5] the degree of control retained by the carrier over the third
party; and [6] the other terms of the contract between the carrier and
the third party.
264. See New York Susquehanna, 500 F.3d at 242 (detailing New Jersey’s
allegations against New York Susquehanna).
265. See id. at 242 (“Susquehanna built these facilities itself and either leased
or owned the land.”).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 247.
268. Id.
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facility.269 These factors are important because they imply a
requirement the rail carrier must assume a certain degree of
liability to transpose its preemptive power.270
The STB has been more circumspect than the federal courts
with regard to transloading and offloading facilities, presuming
there is a difference. For example, in Borough of Riverdale,271 the
STB was asked to determine whether a particular facility was
more corn processing plant—not “integrally related” to
transportation and not covered by the ICC Termination Act—or
more transloading facility, and therefore covered by the Act.272
Rather than deciding, the STB, for procedural reasons not relevant
here, instead provided general guidance regarding their
jurisdiction, suggesting that “manufacturing activities and
facilities” are not subject to STB jurisdiction, whereas “facilities
that are part of a railroad’s ability to provide transportation
services” would be.273
V. The Preemption Clause Does Not and Should Not Cover Crudeby-Rail Offloading Facilities
Whether the ICC Termination Act preempts local land-use
permitting denials over crude-by-rail offloading facilities depends
on the two questions explored at length previously in this Note.
The first question is whether local permitting requirements for the
construction of crude-by-rail offloading facilities are the kind of
regulations the Act was intended to preempt. The second is
whether refineries can properly be considered “rail carriers” and
are therefore subject to STB jurisdiction. Both of these questions

269. Id. at 250.
270. See id. (“Susquehanna could be sued for breach of contract (or potentially
negligence or some other tort) if something went wrong; the Hi Tech railroad could
not . . . .”).
271. 4 S.T.B. 380, 1999 WL 715272.
272. See id. at 387 (“If this facility is not integrally related to providing
transportation services, but rather serves only a manufacturing or production
purpose, then, like any non-railroad property, it would be subject to applicable
state and local regulation.”).
273. Id. at 387.

CAN LOCALITIES STOP CRUDE-BY-RAIL?

191

must be answered in the affirmative before the ICC Termination
Act can preempt local land-use permit denials.
A. Local Regulations Covering Crude-by-Rail Offloading Facilities
Are the “Economic Regulations” Intended to Be Covered by the
ICC Termination Act
Local regulations must be “economic regulations” in order for
the ICC Termination Act to preempt them.274 The text of the Act,
the legislative history, and the case law are in rare alignment on
this point. The first indication that the Act is intended to cover
local regulations over crude offloading facilities comes from the
very text of the statute. For example, the definition of “rail
carrier”—“a person providing common carrier railroad
transportation for compensation”—includes the word “railroad.”275
And the scope of the term “railroad” includes “intermodal
equipment.”276 The Act also hints at the inclusion of transloading
facilities by including “equipment . . . related to the movement of .
. . property” within the definition of “transportation.”277
Crude-by-rail offloading racks bear considerable resemblance
both to “intermodal equipment” and to “transloading facilities.”
The term “intermodal equipment” refers to equipment used to
transfer freight from one mode of transportation (i.e., rail) to
another (i.e., truck).278 As a term of art, this generally pertains to
shipping containers and the equipment used to transport these
containers.279 Whereas “transload” equipment, or in this case
274. See supra Part III.E.2 (discussing the term “economic regulation” in the
ICC Termination Act legislative history).
275. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (defining “rail carrier” per the
ICC Termination Act).
276. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (defining “railroad” per the
ICC Termination Act).
277. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (defining “transportation” per
the ICC Termination Act).
278. See ASS’N OF AM. R.RS., RAIL INTERMODAL KEEPS AMERICA MOVING 1 (Apr.
2016), https://www.aar.org/BackgroundPapers/Rail%20Intermodal.pdf (defining
“rail intermodal”).
279. See id. (“Rail intermodal is the long-haul movement of shipping
containers and truck trailers by rail, combined with a truck or water movement
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“transflow” equipment,280 is defined as a facility that
“accommodate[s] the transfer” of goods between transportation
mediums.281 In this case, the crude offloading rack facilitates the
“transflow” of crude from tank car to pipeline to refinery. The
distance the crude will travel by pipeline is negligible,282 yet, even
this seems to fit the definition and spirit of the ICC Termination
Act.
Moreover, Congress considered both intermodal and
transloading equipment use and sought to incentivize and support
both.283 In fact, Congress specifically noted its intention to “further
foster” intermodal transportation and increase railroad
competitiveness with other modes of transportation.284
Importantly, Congress sought to “remove all existing restrictions
that specifically limit or preclude intermodal . . . operations.”285 It
is difficult to imagine a stronger statement in favor of facilities like
crude offloading racks.
The case law is no less determinative, regarding regulations
impacting transloading and intermodal transportation as
economic regulations. Courts have faced situations in which
localities sought to regulate transloading facilities, and in some
cases, struck these regulations down as preempted.286 For
example, when courts have been presented with environmental

at one or both ends.”).
280. See AM. ASS’N OF STATE HIGHWAY & TRANS. OFFICIALS, TRANSPORTATION:
INVEST IN AMERICA 20, http://rail.transportation.org/Documents/FreightRailReport.pdf
(“‘[T]ransflow’ facilities accommodate the transfer of liquid or ‘flowing’ materials
(e.g., oils, plastics, pellets, bakery flour, etc.) from carload to truck using
specialized pumping equipment.”).
281. Id.
282. See VALERO REFINING CO., VALERO CRUDE BY RAIL PROJECT DESCRIPTION,
supra note 138, at 8 (proposing the addition of 4,000 feet of pipeline for the
installation of a crude-by-rail offloading rack).
283. See supra Part III.E.2 (discussing the term “economic regulation” in the
ICC Termination Act legislative history).
284. See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text (providing insight into
Congress’s thinking regarding the use and support of intermodal and
transloading facilities).
285. Supra note 163 and accompanying text.
286. See supra Part IV.B (examining how economic regulation has been
viewed in the case law).
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regulations and safety regulations287 impacting transloading
facilities, these were found to be preempted by the ICC
Termination Act. Moreover, in Valero Refining Co., the STB
suggests that offloading sites would likely constitute transloading
facilities, but noted that these activities would be preempted only
if performed by, or under the auspices of, a rail carrier.288
For these reasons, the land-use permitting process for crude
offloading facilities constitutes economic regulation. Both
legislative history and jurisprudence strongly indicate the Act
covers these kinds of facilities. Therefore, were a rail carrier, like
Union Pacific, constructing this facility on its own land, the ICC
Termination Act would undoubtedly preempt local permit denials
for the construction of a crude offloading rack at the facility.
However, under this circumstance, it is the refinery constructing
the offloading facility, not the railroad. The refinery must be
within the jurisdictional reach of the STB and be “transportation
by rail carrier” to benefit from preemption.
B. Refineries Are Not “Rail Carriers” and Should Not Be Covered
by the ICC Termination Act
The next question is whether a refinery could ever fall under
STB jurisdiction. In other words, whether a refinery could be a
“rail carrier” under any circumstance. There are two distinct
scenarios under which this issue could arise. The first is similar to
the one in Valero Refining Co., described above. Under this
scenario, the refinery itself applies for the permit to build a crudeby-rail offloading facility on its own land. In the second scenario—
one not explored directly in any case law—the refinery applies for
a land-use permit as the railroad’s agent. In both circumstances,

287. See Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 2005)
(asserting that any distinction between economic and environmental regulation
is “not useful”); Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir.
2001) (determining that regulations specifying “the time a train can occupy a rail
crossing impacts . . . the way a railroad operates its trains, with concomitant
economic ramifications” and are therefore preempted).
288. Valero Refining Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 36036, slip op.
at 4 (STB served Sept. 20, 2016).
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law and public policy militate against preempting generally
applicable land-use permitting processes in favor of crude-by-rail.
1. Refineries Applying for Permits on Their Own Behalf Are Not
“Rail Carriers,” and Local Permit Denials Are Not Preempted by
the ICC Termination Act
The first scenario under which this issue is relevant looks like
the situation described in Valero Refining Co.289 As discussed
above, Valero applied to the Benicia Planning Commission for a
permit on its own behalf and never suggested it was “operating
under the auspices of a rail carrier.”290
The issue is whether a refinery petitioning to build a crude
offloading facility should be considered “transportation by rail
carrier” for the purposes of the ICC Termination Act. Because the
terms “transportation” and “rail carrier” are defined separately
under the Act,291 this issue contains two distinct inquiries: (1)
whether the crude offloading facility is “transportation;” and (2)
whether the refinery is a “rail carrier.” As discussed above, the
offloading facility should be considered transportation.292 Under
the
ICC
Termination
Act,
transportation
includes
“equipment . . . related to the movement of . . . property.”293 This
includes intermodal and transloading facilities, and crude
offloading is similar enough to both forms of transportation.294
As discussed above, the definition of rail carrier is potentially
quite broad.295 However, neither the legislative history, the STB,
nor the federal courts have viewed it this way.296 In fact, central to
289. See id. slip op. at 2–3 (providing the background of the dispute between
Valero and the city of Benicia).
290. Id. slip op. at 5.
291. Supra Part III.C.
292. See supra Part III.C (assessing the meaning of “transportation” in the
ICC Termination Act).
293. 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9)(A).
294. See supra Part V.A (describing rail intermodal and transloading
facilities).
295. Supra Part III.D (analyzing the terms “rail carrier” and “railroad” as
used in the ICC Termination Act).
296. See supra Part III.E.3 & IV.C (discussing the legislative history and case
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the STB’s decision in Valero Refining Co. is the fact that the
Benicia Planning Commission denied “Valero’s off-loading
facility,” not Union Pacific’s.297 Ultimately, generally applicable
local land-use regulation is not railroad regulation, unless the
party applying is a railroad. In this case, it is not. No courts have
gone so far as to impose ICC Termination Act preemption over a
facility not owned or operated by a railroad. In this specific
situation, the refinery alone cannot be considered a “rail carrier,”
and therefore, its land-use permit application is not subject to ICC
Termination Act preemption.
2. Refineries Applying for Permits as Agents of a Railroad Are Not
“Rail Carriers,” and Local Permit Denials Are Not Preempted by
the ICC Termination Act
In Valero Refining Co., the STB suggests that, were Valero
operating “under the auspices of a rail carrier,” the STB’s
declaratory order denying jurisdiction might have had a different
outcome.298 However, it is not so clear that the outcome should be
different. First, the jurisprudence is mixed on this question.299
Second, the legislative history does not suggest that “operating
under the auspices of a rail carrier” was ever even considered.300
On the other hand, the ICC Termination Act’s definition of “rail
carrier,” read broadly, covers an “assignee or personal
representative” of a rail carrier—referred to for convenience as an
“agent” in this section—operating a facility “used or necessary for
transportation.”301 The dichotomy between the practical and
textual definition of “rail carrier” makes this scenario more
complicated than the previous one.

law surrounding the definition of “rail carrier” in the ICC Termination Act).
297. Valero Refining Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 36036, slip op.
at 5 (S.T.B. served Sept. 20, 2016).
298. Id. (determining that the refinery made “no allegation that it is a rail
carrier or that it would be performing offloading under the auspices of rail
carrier”).
299. Supra Part IV.
300. Supra Part III.E.3.
301. See supra Part III.C (discussing the potentially expansive meaning of
“rail carrier” in the ICC Termination Act).
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Unlike the first scenario, refineries and railroads have yet to
attempt to form an agency relationship for these purposes. The
reasons for this are uncertain, but might be a function of two
conditions. First, the refineries simply might not have thought
they needed to worry about local permit denials. The Valero
Refining Co. decision upholding Benicia’s land-use permit denial
was unexpected, and most localities might have assumed they had
little choice but to approve the offloading facility permits. Thus,
there was no need for refineries to create a “work around.”
Second, the agency arrangement is more complex in this
situation than in others that courts have considered. As discussed
above, while there are factors courts apply to determine whether
an agent is operating “under the auspices of a rail carrier,” each
factor is a circuitous attempt to determine the liability the railroad
will be assuming.302 In this circumstance, rather than the railroads
owning the land and leasing it to an agent, as is usually the case,303
the railroad would presumably need to lease—or buy—the land
from the refinery and contract with the refinery to perform
offloading services. This makes the arrangement slightly more
fraught and less desirable to the railroad.
Contrary to the STB’s suggestion in Valero Refining Co.,304 an
agency relationship, in and of itself, is not enough to preempt local
land-use permitting authority. As discussed in subpart IV.C,
courts look to a series of factors to determine whether an agent is
“operating under the auspices of rail carrier.”305 These factors
involve investigating: (1) whether the railroad “holds out” the
facility as part of its business; (2) the degree of control retained by
the railroad; (3) which party has the obligation to maintain the

302. Supra note 270 and accompanying text.
303. See supra Part IV.C (evaluating cases involving third party non-carriers
and agents of rail carriers).
304. See Valero Refining Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 36036, slip
op. at 5 (S.T.B. served Sep. 20, 2016) (noting that Valero has made no showing
that it was applying “on behalf of” a rail carrier).
305. See Padgett v. Surface Transp. Bd., 804 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir. 2015)
(quoting Tex. Cent. Bus. Lines Corp. v. MAALT L.P., 669 F.3d 525, 530–31 (5th
Cir. 2012)) (listing factors the court must consider when determining whether a
third party is operating as an agent of a rail carrier).
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property; (4) which party is liable for incidents occurring on the
property; and (5) the finances of the facility.306
In order to “hold out” a facility as being part of its business,
the railroad is often expected to build the facility itself, own or
lease the property, and advertise the property as its own service.307
For example, in SEA-3,308 a city denied a transloading company’s
(SEA-3) permit to expand its facility because it violated a city
zoning ordinance.309 The STB held that the transloading company
was not a rail carrier, and therefore, the ICC Termination Act did
not preempt city’s permit denial.310 Importantly, the transloading
company itself, not the railroad, “built, own[ed], control[led],
insure[d], and advertise[d]” the facility.311
Conversely, in City of Alexandria,312 the STB found that ICC
Termination Act Preemption Clause “shielded [the ethanol
transloading facility] from most state and local laws, including
zoning laws.”313 The STB considered three determinative factors in
its ruling. First, the railroad “own[s] the Facility and constructed
it with [its] own funds.”314 Second, the license agreement between
the railroad and transloader was not consistent with the
transloader conducting its own independent business under the
guise of a licensee-licensor relationship.315 Last, use of the
transloading facility was offered as part of the railroad’s common
306. Id.
307. See N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 250 (3d
Cir. 2007) (noting the importance of the fact that “Susquehanna, by contracting
directly with the shipper, assumed more liability than the Hi Tech rail carrier”).
308. SEA-3—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35853 (S.T.B. served Mar.
17, 2015).
309. See id. slip op. at 2 (providing the factual background for the SEA-3
order).
310. See id. slip op. at 6–7 (“Without more, this situation does not reflect
undue interference with ‘transportation by rail carriers.’” (quoting 49 U.S.C.
§ 10501(b)).
311. Id. slip op. at 3.
312. City of Alexandria, VA—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35157, slip
op. at 1 (S.T.B. served Feb. 17, 2009).
313. Id. slip op. at 1.
314. Id. slip op. at 3.
315. See id. slip op. at 3–4 (pointing out that the short term of the agreement
and 60-day right to cancel cut in favor of preemption).
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carrier service and bundled with the shipping services for ethanol
producers.316
As these cases demonstrate, the determinative factor is not
about an “agency relationship” alone. Rather, the inquiry focuses
on the amount of liability and ownership responsibility a railroad
truly intends to take on regarding the operation of the facility.
Presumably, this high bar recognizes that a facility must actually
be conducting itself as an arm of the rail carrier, rather than as an
independent firm in disguise.
Given the status of the crude-by-rail industry, these
requirements will be difficult for railroads to meet under any
scenario. As discussed above, at this time, railroads do not invest
in crude offloading facilities at all.317 Therefore, responsibility for
building and maintaining them falls on refineries and crude oil
producers exclusively. This would obviously need to change were
railroads to make an agency-based argument.
Furthermore, some sort of ownership or leasing arrangement
of the property would likely be required. However, a short lease
term would be nonsensical, as the only party benefiting from the
crude offloading facility would be the one refinery in the vicinity.
Who else would a railroad practically “lease” to? This would make
any showing that the agent is not just an independent firm “in
disguise” nearly impossible to make.
With additional degrees of control come additional monetary
obligations. The circumstance under which crude-by-rail is
profitable are already narrow.318 These additional requirements
may be so costly as to remove the economic incentive for railroads
to transport the crude and refineries to receive it. Crude-by-rail is
already a more expensive form of transportation than pipeline and
tanker.319 Unless the resale price of oil or the price of foreign crude
begins to rise dramatically, crude-by-rail will begin to lose its
appeal even if it costs only slightly more.

316. See id. slip op. at 4 (“[The railroad] holds itself out as offering
transloading service at the Alexandria terminal as part of its common carrier
services . . . .”).
317. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the construction of
new crude offloading facilities).
318. See supra Part II.B (providing the costs of crude-by-rail transportation).
319. See supra Part II.B (same).
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For these reasons, the “agency theory” of preemption is not
feasible for crude-by-rail projects. Therefore, localities should not
be preempted from denying land-use permits to refineries, even if
they are acting as agents of a railroad.
VI. Conclusion
Crude oil is a massive industry both in the United States, and
across the world.320 Crude oil producers, refineries, and railroad
companies all stand to gain considerably by the proliferation of
domestic crude throughout the nation by rail car.321 Therefore,
these moneyed interests will continue to pursue favorable
preemption rulings in the courts. The consequences of such rulings
would be immense. The crude-by-rail industry’s ability to preempt
local regulations and land-use permit requirements would hang a
metaphorical “open for business” sign on every community
throughout the entire United States. If preempted, these sites
could be built without any input from the very communities who
will bear the environmental, safety, and economic downside of a
crude-by-rail disaster.
Under no situation should a refinery be considered
“transportation by rail carrier” for the purposes of the ICC
Termination Act. While Congress intended to draft a broadly
applicable deregulatory measure, there is no indication it sought
to allow non-rail firms to use railroad legislation as a pretextual
cloak to conduct non-rail business with impunity. Even though this
is the type of regulation Congress intended to preempt, this is not
the type of party the Act was intended to cover. Refineries are not
rail carriers under the meaning and subsequent interpretation of
the Act, and it is difficult to imagine a situation where refineries
could ever be operating “under the auspices” of a rail carrier to the
satisfaction of jurisprudential standards.

320. See United States Crude Oil Production, TRADING ECONOMICS,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/crude-oil-production (last visited
Feb. 22, 2017) (listing the United States as the third largest crude producer in the
world) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
321. See supra Part II.B (outlining the financial incentive in the crude-by-rail
industry).

